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fendant ''with the intent then and there, and by force and
violence, to have .and accomplish'' the act. The charge is
substantially in the language of sections 220 and 261, subdivision 3. It conforms to the requirements for a statement in
ordinary and concise language and was sufficient to enable
the defendant as a person of common understanding to know
what was intended. (Pen. Code, § 950, subd. 2.)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, 0. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 28,
1951.

[L. A. No. 21601.

In Bank.

June 15, 1951.]

'l'HOMAS E. GREEN, Appellant, v. JAMES 0. BHOWN
et al., Respondents.
[1] Cotenancy-Joint Tenancy-Survivorship.-A gift to two or
more persons for their lives is ordinarily construed as creating
an estate or estates to endure, not only so long as they are
all alive, but until death of the last survivor.
[2] Life Estates-Creation.-A gift to a person for the lives of
himself and another creates an estate in his favor to endure
until death of the survivor, the donee having an estate for his
own life on the death of such other person, while if the donee
is the first to die, the estate then assumes the characteristics
of an estate pur autre vie.
[3] Deeds-Reservations~Interpretation.-In view of Civ. Code,
§ 1069, requiring reservations to be interpreted in favor of the
grantor, under a deed executed by two grantors, reserving a
life estate to both of them in all the property, and the right of
enjoying the same during the term of their lives, the lives of
[1] See 7 Cal.Jur. 334; 14 Am.Jur. 82.
[3] See 9 Cal.Jur. 325; 16 Am.Jur. 615.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Cotenancy,§ 8; [2] Life Estates,§ 2;
[3] Deeds, § 150; [4] Adverse Possession, § 86; [5] Estoppel,
§ 27(1); [6] Specific Performance, § 64; [7] Frauds, Statute of,
§ 59(2); [8] Estoppel, § 24(8); [9] Life Estates, § 14; [10] Life
Estates,§ 7; [11] Equity,§ 20; [12-14] Life Estates,§ 14.
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both must have expired before any part of the use of the
property is lost to either.
Adverse Possession-Payment of Taxes.-Under a conveyance
reserving to donors of real property a life estate during the
term of their lives, donees do not obtain title to the property
as against donors by adverse possession notwithstanding donees
live on the premises and pay half the taxes, where a surviving
donor also lives thereon and pays half the taxes, and no other
elements of adverse possession appear.
Estoppe~-Equitable Estoppel-Reliance on Representation.The court properly determines that a donor of real property is
estopped to deny that, notwithstanding his life estate in the
property, the donees have a permanent home in the premises,
where, during the life of the donor's wife who joined in the
deed, the parties had lived for many years on the premises on
an expense sharing basis and in a fiduciary relationship; where
upon her death, he indicated things would continue as usual,
and that he would need only one room; and where he acquiesced
in improvements made by the donees.
Specific Performance-Part Performance.-The part performance required as a prerequisite to specific performance is not
necessarily part of the agreed exchange for defendant's performance but may be merely action in reliance on his promise,
as in a promise to make a gift of land, which becomes specifically enforceable as soon as the promisee has so far acted in
reliance on the promise as to make it very unjust not to compel
execution of the gift.
Frauds, Statute of-Estoppel to Assert Statute.-Under a parol
gift of land on which the ·donee makes improvements, he is
not required to show ignorance of status of the title as a prerequisite to asserting the donor to be estopped to set up the
statute of frauds or repudiate the gift, since it is assumed
that, at the time the gift was made, the donor had title and
the donee knew, but that donee accepted the property as a
gift and treated it as his own.
Estoppel- Equitable Estoppel- Injury or Prejudice.- Sufficient detriment to establish an estoppel against a donor of a
home valued at $25,000 is shown by evidence that donees expended $4,100 on improvements, about $900 on an indebtedness
against the property, and more than $400 on taxes.
Life Estates-Actions-Judgments.-In an action under a deed
reserving a life estate in a husband and wife in all the property, and the right of enjoying the same during the term of
their lives, it was error for the judgment to declare that, after
the death of the wife, the deed reserved a life estate for the

[5] See 10 Cal.Jur. 628; 19 Am.Jur. 743.
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husband in only an undivided half interest in the premises;
and in view of the evidence the portion of the judgment stating
that his interest was limited to his personal use and was
subordinate to the paramount actual possession of the donees,
had to be reversed as not being sufficiently intelligible or certain.
[10] !d.-Imposing Lien on Life Estate.-The court errs in imposing on a donor's life estate a lien, in favor of donees residing
on the premises with him, for improvements made and taxes
paid by them, where donees receive their interest in the property only under the theory that after receiving it as a gift they
suffered detriment in such amounts.
[11] Equity-Relief-Disposition of Entire Controversy.-The fact
that equity may decide all the issues between parties does not
mean that there does not have to be some basis in law or equity
to decide the issues one way or the other, since the rule is
merely one of equity jurisdiction defining the scope of relief
which may be granted.
[12] Life Estates-Actions-Evidence.-In an action for declaration of rights under a conveyance of real property reserving
a life estate in husband and wife donors, the court properly
admits evidence that donees made a declaration of homestead
on the property shortly after the gift, notwithstanding the
evidence is not relevant as to title, where the declaration, being
made at the suggestion of a donor, is relevant as indicating
that a gift of the right to occupy the premises was intended
and accepted.
· [13] Id.-Actions-Evidence.-In construing a conveyance of real
property reserving a life estate in husband and wife, evidence
is irrelevant as to the husband's failure, on his wife's death,
to establish such death pursuant to Prob. Code, §§ 1170-1175.
[14] Id.-Actions-Evidence.-In an action for declaration of
rights under a conveyance reserving in a husband and wife
as donors a life estate in property on which they resided with
donees, the court properly admits evidence that donees would
not have made certain improvements after death of the donor
wife had they known her husband had remarried, where the
evidence is relevant on the issue whether they relied on his
assurances that they could occupy the property without interference from him.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Carl A. Stutsman, Judge. Reversed.
Action for declaration of rights under a conveyance of real
property. Judgment for defendants reversed.
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Jefferson & Jefferson, Bernard S. Jefferson and Martha
Malone Jefferson for Appellant.
Oscar S. Elvrum for Respondents.
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff and his wife, Etta Green, were
the owners as joint tenants of real property, with a home
thereon in which they were residing. Living with them were
defendants, James Brown and his wife, Zephrene, who was
the daughter of Etta by a former marriage. The Browns were
paying $25 a month to the Greens. In 1941 the Greens conveyed the property to the Browns and the parties continued to
occupy the home, the Browns agreeing to pay the Greens $20
a month on an indebtedness against the property and half
the taxes and utilities.
The conveyance above mentioned was made by a deed in
which the Greens granted to the Browns the title to the property "subject, however, to the Life Estate hereinafter reserved . . . '' The reservation clause to which reference is
made reads: ''RESERVING and ExcEPTING, however, a Life Estate in the Grantors above named in all of the above described
property, and the right to use, occupy and enjoy the same
and to receive the rents, issues and profits therefrom during
the term of their natural lives.''
In 1943, Etta Green died. Plaintiff continued to live in
the house with the Browns. He remarried and difficulties
arose between him and the Browns; the instant action followed.
The trial court determined that under the deed the death
of Etta terminated her life estate in an undivided half interest in the property and plaintiff had an estate for his life in
an undivided half interest in the property. This is predicated on the proposition that the reservation in the deed was
of a life estate in an undivided half interest in each of the
grantors, making the grantors tenants in common of a life
estate in the property; that if the life estate were in joint
tenancy then the survivor would have a life estate in the whole
property. This construction of the deed is predicated on the
rule that a joint tenancy is created by a transfer to two or
more persons when expressly declared by the transfer to be
such. ( Civ. Code, §§ 683, 686.) In the light of that rule
other factors must be considered. [1] The general rule is
stated as follows : ''A gift to two or more persons for their
lives is ordinarily construed as creating an estate or estates
to endure, not so long only as they are all alive, but until
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the death of the last survivor. [2] And a gift to a person
for the lives of himself and another clearly creates an estate
in his favor to endure until the death of the survivor, the
donee having an estate for his own life upon the death of
such other person, while if the donee is the :first to die, the
estate then assumes the characteristics of an estate pur autre
vie." (Tiffany, Real Property,§ 49.) (See Flagg v. Badger,
58 Me. 258; Kenney v. Wentworth, 77 Me. 203; Saunders v.
Saunders, 373 Ill. 302 [26 N.E.2d 126, 129 A.L.R. 306] ; Dow
v. Doyle, 103 Mass. 489; Douglas v. Parsons, 22 Ohio St. 526;
Ogle v. Barker, (Ind.App.) 63 N.E.2d 432; Glover v. Stillson,
56 Conn. 316 [15 A. 752] ; Corbin v. Manley, 291 Ky. 289 [164
S.W.2d 394].) [3] The words of the reservation are that
a life estate is saved to both grantors in all of the property
and the right of enjoying the same (all of it) during the term
of ''their lives.'' That is, the lives of both of them must have
expired before any part of the use of the property is lost to
either of them. Those words are equivalent to the phrases
''joint tenancy'' or ''to the survivor of them.'' This construction is fortified by the statutory provision that reservations are "to be interpreted in favor of the grantor." ( Civ.
Code, § 1069.) There is nothing in Heiden v. Howes, 77 Ohio
App. 525 [67 N.E.2d 641], or Guyer v. London, 187 Okla. 326
[102 P.2d 875], relied upon by defendants, contrary to the
holding of the foregoing authorities.
[4] Defendants contend that they acquired title to the property by adverse possession because they have been in possession and paid half the taxes. Plaintiff has also been occupying
the property. There is no :finding on any issue of adverse
possession. The trial court found: ''That it is true that the
cross-complainants and defendants, James 0. Brown and
Zephrene C. Brown, and each of them, have had the continuous actual possession of said Lot one ( 1), commonly known
as 2202 Juliet Street, ever since December 15, 1941, and
that they, and each of them, are now in actual possession of
said real property." But, no other elements of adverse possession appear. The court found that Etta died and "said
Life Estate of Etta C. P. Green in said (property] ipso facto
terminated and vested in said remaindermen, James 0. Brown
and Zephrene C. Brown, as Joint Tenants, on the date of the
death of said decedent,'' which is simply a conclusion of law
based upon the court's erroneous interpretation of the deed,
rather than a :finding of adverse possession. Moreover, it is
found that after Etta's death plaintiff had, pursuant to the
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deed, a life estate in an undivided half interest in the property.
[5] In its judgment the court determined that plaintiff's
life estate in a half interest is further limited in that it is
''. . . in all respects subordinate to the paramount actual
possession of said property theretofore delivered to said James
0. Brown and Zephrene C. Brown, as Joint Tenants, and exclusively limited to said Thomas E. Green's sole occupancy
and personal use during the period of his natural life, and
not otherwise.'' 'rhat limitation is apparently predicated on
its conclusions of law that plaintiff "does not come into Court
in the above entitled cause with clean hands, and he is equitably estopped from prevailing in this proceeding and he is
guilty of laches.'' That conclusion is presumably based on
the findings that a fiduciary relationship existed between Etta
and plaintiff and defendants; that at the time of the marriage
of Etta and plaintiff, the latter was in "poor financial circumstances" while Etta had a sum of money which was later
increased; that defendants, with plaintiff's consent, have been
occupying the property with plaintiff and Etta on a ''share
and share alike basis'' ; that in 1942, plaintiff and Etta abandoned a homestead they had declared on the property and
defendants made a homestead declaration on the property
at plaintiff's and Etta's "recommendations and suggestions";
that plaintiff's "aforesaid remaining vested life estate is in
all respects exclusively limited to the sole occupancy and personal use of said [plaintiff] during the period of his natural
life, and not otherwise . . .
''That it is true that thereafter the defendants . . . in the
utmost good faith, proceeded to improve said premises with
the consent of the plaintiff . . . and on the 21st day of May,
1945, the parties involved in this action made, executed and
delivered that certain unrecorded Deed of Trust covering
said real property from Thomas E. Green, a widower, and
James 0. Brown and Zephrene C. Brown, husband and wife,
as Trustor, to Los Angeles Trust and Safe Deposit Company,
a California corporation, to secure an indebtedness in favor
of Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles in the sum
of $2,500.00 and other amounts payable under the terms
thereof.
''That it is true that thereafter a demand was made by said
Bank for an additional sum of $200.00 for Termite Inspection
and control of said premises, and said loan was later cancelled.
''. . . that the defendants . . . discussed the contemplated
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loans with the plaintiff . . . and he recommended that they
secure a loan for the improvement of said property from
another source so that the defendants . . . could fully enjoy
their lifetime home in said premises; . . . that the defendants . . . obtained $1600.00 from an endowment Life Insurance Policy and borrowed $500.00 from the Postal Credit
Union of Los Angeles, without using the plaintiff's . . .
credit or encumbering said premises; that . . . defendants,
. . . relying upon the statements of plaintiff, . . . that they
were in possession of their permanent home, thereafter expended, in the utmost good faith, said sum of $2100.00, and
other additional amounts, in repairing, remodeling and improving said premises . . . ''
Plaintiff asserts that the evidence does not support those
findings. From defendants' evidence it appears that they
have been living with the Greens, plaintiff and Etta, since
the 1920's. When the home, a nine-room house, the property
here involved, was acquired in 1927, they continued to live
together under a "share and share alike" basis, as the defendants describe it, whereby the living expenses and expenses
of the property were shared by both families. Prior to the
execution of the deed in 1941, which conveyed the property
from the Greens to the Browns, the latter had been paying
the Greens $25 per month, and thereafter they paid less, but
they also paid the balance of an indebtedness against the
property. In 1941, when the deed was made, and thereafter,
defendants were assured by Etta and plaintiff that they would
have a permanent home on the property and they would
''share and share alike.'' Defendants have paid, as found by
the court, half of the city and county taxes on the property
ranging from $138 to $152 each year from 1942 to 1948.
Shortly after its execution, the Greens abandoned a homestead
they had declared on the property, and at their suggestion,
defendants declared a homestead on it. After Etta's death
in 1943, plaintiff told defendants that things would continue
as usual, "share and share alike" and that they had a permanent home on the property. He ate his meals with them and
the taxes were borne equally. Early in 1945, they consulted
with him with reference to improvements on the property
consisting of redecorating and new furniture. He agreed that
they should go ahead and do as they wished. . Money was
borrowed and the improvements were made, consisting of
painting the outside of the house, redecorating some of the
interior, and purchasing new furniture. The old furniture
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was sold with plaintiff's consent and he received the proceeds
of the sale. The improvements cost about $4,000. At the time
the improvements were made plaintiff said he would need only
one room in the house. He repeatedly stated after Etta's
death that if he remarried, he would not bring his new wife
into the house to live. He remarried in April, 1945, but did
not reveal his marriage until the following September, after
the improvements were made, at which time he stated that he
wanted to move his wife into the house. Defendant, Mrs.
Brown, testified, over plaintiff's objection on the ground of
irrelevancy, that they would not have made the improvements
if they knew he was going to remarry.
This evidence seems sufficient to support the findings. Although it may be, to some extent, consistent with the life
estate reserved in the deed, and thus not a basis for a restricted
occupancy by plaintiff, yet it is also susceptible of the inference, that even during the plaintiff's life, as well as after
his death, defendants were to have the use and occupancy
of the property as a home. The long course of conduct and
assurances by plaintiff and Etta could lead defendants to
believe that they had a permanent home and plaintiff would
not interfere with their occupancy of it as shown by the
pattern which had long been followed. There is no direct
evidence, as stated by plaintiff, that defendants relied upon
plaintiff's assurances and conduct in making the improvements
and other expenditures, but we believe it may be inferred.
It appears from the evidence that most of the assurances
were made several years before the improvements were made,
but in view of the fiduciary relationship between the parties,
the absence of any withdrawal or repudiation of the arrangement, and plaintiff's acquiescence in the improvements, we
cannot say that the trial court was unjustified in its conclusion.
Plaintiff asserts that the following elements of an estoppel
are not present here: (1) No showing that plaintiff had any
reason to believe defendants were making the improvements
in reliance on his assurances; ( 2) Defendants were as fully
aware as plaintiff, or should have been, of the true status
of the title (a life estate in Etta and plaintiff) ; ( 3) There
is no showing of a detriment suffered by defendants in that
the improvements were beneficial to defendants' remainder
interest and were of slight cost in comparison with the market
value of the property as well as its rental value, and were
temporary in character.
From the evidence presented, a legal theory upon which
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a judgment may be based "is, that the Greens made an oral
gift to defendants of a right to occupy the property with
plaintiff; and that defendants accepted said gift by remaining in possession of the property and making expenditures
for improvements thereon. An estoppel would then arise
against plaintiff to rely upon the statute of frauds or repudiate the gift. [6] The rule is stated as follows: "It has
been previously explained that the part performance required
by the courts as a prerequisite of specific enforcement is not
necessarily any part of the agreed exchange for the defendant's
performance that is compelled. It may be merely action in
reliance on the defendant's promise. That is particularly
evident in the case of a promise to make a gift of land; there
is no agreed exchange of any kind, otherwise the transaction
would not be a gift. These promises become specifically enforceable as soon as the promisee has so far acted in reliance
on the promise as to make it very unjust (perha"ps again
called a 'virtual fraud') not to compel execution of the gift.''
(Corbin on Contracts, § 441.) (See Peixouto v. Peixouto, 40
CaLApp. 782 [181 P. 830] ; Howard v. Stephens, 38 Cal.App.
296 [176 P. 65]; Kinsell v. Thomas, 18 Cal.App. 683 [124
P. 220] ; Rest., Couts., § 197; Kennedy v. Scally, 62 Cal.App.
367 [217 P. 96]; Burris v. Landers, 114 Cal. 310 [46 P. 162];
Manly v. Howlett, 55 Cal. 94; Anson v. Townsend, 73 Cal. 415,
417 [15 P. 49]; Husheon v. Kelley, 162 Cal. 656 [124 P. 231];
Alpha Stores, Ltd. v. Croft, 60 Cal.App.2d 349 [140 P.2d 688] ;
Bekins v. Smith, 37 Cal.App. 222 [174 P. 96] .)
Plaintiff urges, however, that there was no showing that h11,
had reason to believe defendants relied upon the Greens'
assurances and gift. He cites Bt"ddle Boggs v. Merced Mining
Co., 14 Cal. 279 and Lindley v. Blumberg, 7 Cal.App. 140
[93 P. 894]. Those cases involved silence on the part of the
owner of property, while another claims ownership and changes
his position. There is no element of gift in those cases.
[7] Next, plaintiff relies upon similar cases (Matt v. Nardo,
73 Cal.App.2d 159 [166 P.2d 37], Killian v. Conselho Supremo
etc. Portugneza, 31 Cal.App.2d 497 [88 P.2d 214], and Raynor
v. Drew, 72 Cal. 307 [13 P. 866], for the proposition that in
order to rely on that kind of estoppel the one urging it must
be ignorant of the true state of the title. Where, however,
there is a parol gift, that principle has no application, for it
is assumed that at the time the gift was made, the donor had
title and the donee knew, yet the latter accepted it as a gift
and treated it as his property.
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[8] A more serious objection to defendants' position is
that they have not suffered sufficient detriment to establish an
estoppel-that the outlay by them was trifling and not lasting,
or to phrase it in the language of part performance, there
has not been enough. The reasonable rental value of the
property was $100 per month, and its market value was
$25,000 at the time the witnesses were questioned. The court
found that defendants expended $2,100 and ''other additional
amounts" in improving the property. There is evidence that
they expended $4,100. In addition, the court found that they
paid half the taxes on the property for the years 1942 to
1948, and the total taxes for some years were as follows :
1946-$152.39; 1947-$138.01; 1948-$142.40. And, also, it
is found that they paid an indebtedness against the property
amounting to $886.42. The improvements consisted of painting
the exterior of the house, redecorating a portion of the interior, laying carpets, replacing furniture and the removal
of some inside fixtures. The rule is stated in Burris v. Landers,
supra, 114 Cal. 310, 315 that: " . . . the expenditures . . .
must be in the nature of lasting benefits and improvements to
the land, tending to enhance its value over and above the
value of the use of the property to the plaintiff. . . . Slight
and temporary improvements, or trivial outlays, made to suit
the taste or convenience of the occupant, do not raise an equity
in favor of the donee . . . for, if the value of the expenditures
made by the occupant does not exceed the benefit to him of
the use of the land without charge or rental, then, generally,
and in the absence of other circumstances of hardship shown,
~he not only will not have been injured, but will in fact have
been advantaged by the promises made." (See, also, Jonas
v. Leland, 77 Cal.App.2d 770 [176 P.2d 764] .) We believe
that under all the circumstances here presented, including the
fiduciary relationship between the parties, the rule has been
satisfied.
[9] Plaintiff urges that the judgment restricting his use
of the property is erroneous. We hold that the judgment is
erroneous in declaring that the deed reserved a life estate
for plaintiff in only an undivided half interest in the premises.
It further contains the clause heretofore quoted, that plaintiff's interest is "subordinate" to the "paramount actual
possession'' of defendants and is limited to his personal use.
Precisely what is meant by such an adjudication is difficult
to ascertain. There is no evidence that defendants' right of
occupancy was to be superior to that of plaintiff, or that the
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latter's right was limited to his personal use, except casual
remarks made by plaintiff that he would only need a room or
two for himself and that he would not bring a second wife
into the house. In that state of the record we do not believe
that that portion of the judgment is sufficiently intelligible or
certain. As we have seen, the evidence shows that both plaintiff
and Etta, and later plaintiff, as well as defendants, were to
remain on as usual as occupants of the property. One concrete
way of expressing it might be that defendants own an undivided half interest in the property for plaintiff's life and the
whole thereafter, and plaintiff owns an undivided half interest
for his life, all by reason of a parol gift by plaintiff and Etta
of a half of their life estate, but it has not been stated with
certainty in the judgment, therefore, it must be reversed.
[10] Plaintiff claims that the court erred in imposing liens
in favor of defendants on plaintiff's life estate. The court
impressed a lien in favor of defendants for $2,100, for the
improvements and for the half of the taxes paid by defendants.
It is difficult to find any basis for that adjudication. If the
basic theory is a parol gift followed by a detriment in reliance thereon, it would seem the detriment suffered should
not be charged against the plaintiff-donor as a debt. Defendants-donees have received the property. [11] Defendants cite
no authority to support that part of the judgment, except
cases holding that in equity the court may decide all the
issues between the parties. That may well be true, but it does
not mean that there does not have to be some basis in law or
equity to decide such issues one way or the other. It is merely
a rule of equity jurisdiction and the scope of the relief that
may be granted.
[12] Finally, plaintiff complains of rulings on the admission of evidence. There was admitted the declaration of a
homestead on the property by defendants shortly after the
execution of the deed. It is true that such declaration, in itself,
was not relevant, for it would not affect title, but as it was
made with the consent and at the suggestion of Etta, it had
some relevancy as indicating that a gift of the right to occupy
the property was intended by the Greens and accepted by
defendants.
[13] Evidence was admitted that no proceedings had been
had by plaintiff to establish Etta's death pursuant to sections
1170-1175 of the Probate Code. We agree that it was irrelevant.
[14] The testimony by Mrs. Brown that she would not have
made the improvements on the property if she had known
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plaintiff had remarried was admissible. It had some relevancy
on the subject of reliance by defendants, that is, that they relied upon the assurances that they could occupy the property
without undue interference by plaintiff.
Judgment reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
Edmonds, J., concurred m the judgment.

[L. A. Nos. 21768, 21861. In Bank. June 19, 1951.]

Estate of LOUISE E. DABNEY, Deceased, CLIFFORD R.
DABNEY et al., Petitioners, v. MILTON H. PHILLEO,
as Executor, etc., et al., Respondents.
[1] Decedents' Estates-Distribution-AppeaL-On petitions for
writ of supersedeas to stay further proceedings in an estate
pending appeals from orders of ratable distribution, respondents cannot successfully urge that petitioners are not persons
interested in such estate where it appears from portions of
respondents' answers, from the records on the appeals, and
from statements of counsel in the oral argument before the
Supreme Court, that the existence of such interest is one of
the points directly concerned in the pending appeals.
[2] Appeal-Supersedeas-Purpose.-The correctness of the decision of the trial court is not involved in a supersedeas proceeding, its purpose being merely to suspend the enforcement
of the judgment pending appeal.
[3] !d.-Supersedeas-Particular Judgments Stayed by Perfecting
AppeaL-Under the provisions of Code Civ. Proc., § 949, the
perfecting of an appeal from a decree of distribution by an
appellant who is not required to perform the directions of the
judgment or order appealed from stays proceedings in the
court below on the judgment appealed from.
[4] !d.-Supersedeas-Necessity of Security.-Where an order
appealed from requires no acts to be performed by appellants
[2] See 2 Cal.Jur. 422; 3 Am.Jur. 195.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates,§ 1066; [2] Appeal
and Error, § 390 ; [ 3] Appeal and Error, § 400 ; [ 4] Appeal and
Error, § 394; [5, 7] Appeal and Error, § 406; [6] Appeal and
Error, §440; [8,9] Appeal and Error, §407; [10] Appeal and
Error,§ 431.

